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2.6 MB
Extraction Summary
1
People
3
Organizations
5
Locations
0
Events
0
Relationships
5
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Policy paper / report / testimony (house oversight document)
File Size:
2.6 MB
Summary
This document appears to be a page from a policy report or testimony, marked with a House Oversight Bates stamp. It discusses U.S. foreign policy strategy regarding Iran, arguing against reducing forces in the Persian Gulf and suggesting diplomatic approaches to differentiate between unacceptable and tolerable Iranian behaviors. A section header introduces Thomas Pickering, followed by text discussing the dangers of accepting a nuclear-armed Iran and the risks to nonproliferation policy.
People (1)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Thomas Pickering | Subject/Author |
Name appears as a bold header introducing a section discussing containment policy and nuclear deterrence regarding Iran.
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Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States Government |
Referenced as 'United States', 'Washington', 'U.S. officials', 'U.S. government'.
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| Islamic Republic of Iran |
Referenced as 'Iran', 'Islamic Republic', 'Tehran'.
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| House Oversight Committee |
Inferred from footer 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018205'.
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Locations (5)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
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Region of strategic interest.
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Referenced in context of a strategic 'pivot'.
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Location for potential force deployment.
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Metonym for U.S. Government.
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Metonym for Iranian Government.
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Key Quotes (5)
"Nowhere else in the world is America more likely to deploy forces than in the Persian Gulf in opposition to Iran"Source
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Quote #1
"Washington must discriminate between Iranian behaviors it considers unacceptable -- such as support for terrorism, hegemonic ambitions, and progress toward nuclear weapons -- and those it can tolerate."Source
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Quote #2
"U.S. officials could open the door for negotiations by making clear to Tehran that they do not seek regime change"Source
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Quote #3
"the appointment of a senior subcabinet official whose sole responsibility is Iran... could allow the administration to reorganize bureaucratically"Source
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Quote #4
"If Iran attains a nuclear weapon, other regional powers would likely follow suit"Source
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Quote #5
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,139 characters)
regime does in fact survive, Iran would become increasingly emboldened, with potentially disastrous consequences for the United States and its allies and interests in the Middle East.
Denuding U.S. forces in the region to enable a pivot to Asia is also risky. Nowhere else in the world is America more likely to deploy forces than in the Persian Gulf in opposition to Iran, and nowhere else is it of utmost importance that any potential confrontation be won decisively in the next five to ten years than with the Islamic Republic.
Going forward, Washington must discriminate between Iranian behaviors it considers unacceptable -- such as support for terrorism, hegemonic ambitions, and progress toward nuclear weapons -- and those it can tolerate. U.S. officials could open the door for negotiations by making clear to Tehran that they do not seek regime change; the first step in that regard would be to let Iran know that Washington respects it as a nation-state and not a transnational revolutionary movement.
Finally, disorganization within the U.S. government and a "go it alone" mentality have accounted for many of Washington's internal difficulties in responding to the Iranian challenge. To alleviate this problem, all cabinet-level officials must be in constant and complete coordination, devoid of routine bureaucratic obstacles. In addition, the appointment of a senior subcabinet official whose sole responsibility is Iran (or, alternatively, a small group of officials in constant coordination) could allow the administration to reorganize bureaucratically in preparation for this year of decision.
Denuding U.S. forces in the region to enable a pivot to Asia is also risky. Nowhere else in the world is America more likely to deploy forces than in the Persian Gulf in opposition to Iran, and nowhere else is it of utmost importance that any potential confrontation be won decisively in the next five to ten years than with the Islamic Republic.
Going forward, Washington must discriminate between Iranian behaviors it considers unacceptable -- such as support for terrorism, hegemonic ambitions, and progress toward nuclear weapons -- and those it can tolerate. U.S. officials could open the door for negotiations by making clear to Tehran that they do not seek regime change; the first step in that regard would be to let Iran know that Washington respects it as a nation-state and not a transnational revolutionary movement.
Finally, disorganization within the U.S. government and a "go it alone" mentality have accounted for many of Washington's internal difficulties in responding to the Iranian challenge. To alleviate this problem, all cabinet-level officials must be in constant and complete coordination, devoid of routine bureaucratic obstacles. In addition, the appointment of a senior subcabinet official whose sole responsibility is Iran (or, alternatively, a small group of officials in constant coordination) could allow the administration to reorganize bureaucratically in preparation for this year of decision.
THOMAS PICKERING
Discussions of containment policy typically imply accepting the Islamic Republic as an inevitable nuclear power and using deterrence to deal with a nuclear-armed Iran. Yet such an outcome would be disastrous for U.S. nonproliferation policy, which is based on the notion that fewer nuclear states means less chance of miscalculated use. If Iran attains a nuclear weapon, other regional powers would likely follow suit -- clearly an undesirable outcome for the international community.
Discussions of containment policy typically imply accepting the Islamic Republic as an inevitable nuclear power and using deterrence to deal with a nuclear-armed Iran. Yet such an outcome would be disastrous for U.S. nonproliferation policy, which is based on the notion that fewer nuclear states means less chance of miscalculated use. If Iran attains a nuclear weapon, other regional powers would likely follow suit -- clearly an undesirable outcome for the international community.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018205
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