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Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11-1 Filed 07/12/19 Page 6 of 10

Honorable Henry Pitman
United States Magistrate Judge
July 8, 2019
Page 6

Multiple victims, including several specified in the Indictment, have provided information
against the defendant. That information is detailed, credible, and corroborated, in many instances,
by other witnesses and contemporaneous documents, records and other evidence—including, as
further detailed below, evidence from a search of the New York Residence on the night of the
defendant’s arrest that reflects an extraordinary volume of photographs of nude and partially-nude
young women or girls. Such corroborating evidence also includes documents and other materials,
such as contemporaneous notes, messages recovered from the defendant’s residence that include
names and contact information for certain victims, and call records that confirm the defendant and
his agents were repeatedly in contact with various victims during the charged period. Put simply,
all of this evidence – the voluminous and credible testimony of individuals who were sexually
abused by the defendant as minors, each of whom are backed up by other evidence – will be
devastating evidence of guilt at any trial in this case and weighs heavily in favor of detention.

Finally, it bears noting that neither the age of the conduct nor the defendant’s previous non-
prosecution agreement (“NPA”) with a different federal district pose any impediment to his
conviction. As an initial matter, all of the conduct is timely charged, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3283,
which was amended in 2003 to extend the limitations period for conduct that was timely as of the
date of the amendment, to any time during the lifetime of the minor victim. See United States v.
Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 922-25 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that because Congress extended the statute
of limitations for sex offenses involving minors during the time the previous statute was still
running, the extension was permissible); United States v. Pierre-Louis, No. 16 Cr. 541 (CM), 2018
WL 4043140, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018) (same).

Moreover, with respect to the NPA, that agreement, to which the Southern District of New
York was not a party, which by its express language pertained exclusively to the SDFL
investigation, and which did not purport to bind any other Office or District, does not preclude
prosecution in this District for at least two reasons. First, it is well settled in the Second Circuit
that “a plea agreement in one U.S. Attorney’s office does not, unless otherwise stated, bind
another.” United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App’x 920, 921 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A plea agreement binds
only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it
affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.”) (citing United States
v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). This is true even if the text of the
agreement purports to bind “the Government.” See Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672. This analysis
similarly extends to a non-prosecution agreement. See United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. 851,
854 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Defendant’s argument, in effect, is that unless there is an explicit statement
to the contrary, it is presumed that a non-prosecution agreement binds offices of the United States
Attorney that are not parties to the agreement. This position is at odds with the law in this Circuit,
which presumes a narrow reading of the boundaries of a plea agreement unless a defendant can
affirmatively establish that a more expansive interpretation was contemplated.”) (citing Annabi,
771 F.2d at 672). Second, the Indictment charges conduct not covered by the NPA, namely

the presumptions and the § 3142(g) factors in deciding whether the defendant should be
detained.”).

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