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705 KB
Extraction Summary
8
People
3
Organizations
1
Locations
4
Events
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Relationships
5
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
705 KB
Summary
This document is a page from a legal filing, dated February 4, 2021, which argues for a specific interpretation of the statutory phrase "offense involving." It cites several court precedents, including cases like Kawashima v. Holder and United States v. Morgan, to support the position that this phrase requires looking at the essential elements of the crime itself, not merely the surrounding circumstances. The D.C. Circuit's analysis of a venue statute is used as a key example to illustrate that for an offense to 'involve' an activity like interstate transportation, that activity must be a formal element of the offense.
People (8)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Bridges |
Mentioned as a party in a legal case precedent: "Since Bridges, the Court has repeatedly emphasized..."
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| Shular |
Mentioned as a party in a legal case citation: "See Shular, 140 S.Ct. at 785"
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| Kawashima |
Mentioned as a party in a legal case citation: "Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 484 (2012)"
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| Holder |
Mentioned as a party in a legal case citation: "Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 484 (2012)"
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| Leocal |
Mentioned as a party in a legal case citation: "Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004)"
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| Ashcroft |
Mentioned as a party in a legal case citation: "Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004)"
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| Davis |
Mentioned as a party in a legal case citation: "United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2328 (2019)"
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| Morgan |
Mentioned as a party in a legal case citation: "In United States v. Morgan, the D.C. Circuit used this approach..."
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Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| The Court | government agency |
Refers to a court, likely the Supreme Court, that has emphasized a particular legal approach.
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| D.C. Circuit | government agency |
A court that interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) in the case of United States v. Morgan.
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| DOJ | government agency |
Appears in the footer as part of a document identifier: "DOJ-OGR-00002667".
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Timeline (4 events)
2004
The case of United States v. Morgan, where the D.C. Circuit interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) regarding offenses involving interstate commerce.
D.C. Circuit
2019
The case of United States v. Davis, which stated that a statutory phrase should have a fixed meaning.
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
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Mentioned in the context of a venue statute regarding importation into the United States.
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Relationships (4)
Opposing parties in the legal case United States v. Davis.
Opposing parties in the legal case United States v. Morgan.
Key Quotes (5)
"offenses that involve fraud or deceit"Source
— Kawashima v. Holder
(Quoted as being interpreted to mean “offenses with elements that necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct”.)
DOJ-OGR-00002667.jpg
Quote #1
"offense that . . . involves” language “requires us to look to the elements and the nature of the offense . . . rather than to the particular facts"Source
— Leocal v. Ashcroft
(A statement from the case explaining the proper approach to interpreting statutes with "involves" language.)
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Quote #2
"In all but the most unusual situations, a single use of a statutory phrase must have a fixed meaning."Source
— United States v. Davis
(A quote supporting the consistent interpretation of statutory language.)
DOJ-OGR-00002667.jpg
Quote #3
"[t]he most natural reading” of the statute is “to construe ‘any offense involving’ by reference to the elements of the offense at issue."Source
— United States v. Morgan
(The D.C. Circuit's conclusion on how to interpret the venue statute 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).)
DOJ-OGR-00002667.jpg
Quote #4
"[T]he circumstances surrounding the crime include [the defendant’s] travel in interstate commerce, but his crime is not an “offense involving” transportation in interstate commerce. In other words, a faithful reading of the precise words of the statute in the order in which they are written suggests that an “offense involv[es]” transportation in interstate commerce only when such transportation is an element of the offense."Source
— United States v. Morgan
(An illustrative example from the D.C. Circuit case explaining that for an offense to 'involve' interstate commerce, such commerce must be an element of the crime itself, not just a surrounding circumstance.)
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Quote #5
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,182 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 19 of 25
Since Bridges, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that statutory references to an “offense involving” or “offenses involving” certain elements call for such an approach. See Shular, 140 S.Ct. at 785; Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 484 (2012) (interpreting “offenses that involve fraud or deceit” to mean “offenses with elements that necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct”) (internal punctuation omitted); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004) (stating that “offense that . . . involves” language “requires us to look to the elements and the nature of the offense . . . rather than to the particular facts” at issue); see also United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2328 (2019) (“In all but the most unusual situations, a single use of a statutory phrase must have a fixed meaning.”). Thus, only if the offense “necessarily entails” the identified conduct can it be said to be an “offense involving” that conduct. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 484.
In United States v. Morgan, the D.C. Circuit used this approach in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), a venue statute that applies to “[a]ny offense involving the use of the mails, transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, or the importation of an object or person into the United States.” The court concluded that “[t]he most natural reading” of the statute is “to construe ‘any offense involving’ by reference to the elements of the offense at issue.” 393 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). The court then gave an illustrative example of a case in which a defendant travels in interstate commerce, commits a federal offense, and then returns home via interstate commerce:
[T]he circumstances surrounding the crime include [the defendant’s] travel in interstate commerce, but his crime is not an “offense involving” transportation in interstate commerce. In other words, a faithful reading of the precise words of the statute in the order in which they are written suggests that an “offense involv[es]” transportation in interstate commerce only when such transportation is an element of the offense.
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DOJ-OGR-00002667
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