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“single territorial unit” under Oslo. In essence, and very probably in name, this meant a Palestinian state. I wasn’t opposed to that in principle, if it was in return for a full and final peace. But the Oslo process meant that we would be handing back land, and control over security, in an ever-larger portion of territory before we’d reached any so-called permanent-status agreement. In fact, before we even knew whether that would prove possible. It wasn’t “land for peace.” It was land for the promise, or maybe only the hope, of peace. It was the same problem Yitzhak had faced over the Americans’ misuse of our “pocket deposit” on the Golan. I realized that, having come this far with Oslo, neither he nor the government was likely to back away from approving the Gaza-Jericho accord. But he did say he thought the points I’d raised were important, which I took as meaning he was comfortable with my raising it with the cabinet.

I spoke near the end of the four-hour cabinet meeting to ratify the Gaza-Jericho plan. The ministers seemed attentive as I ran through the security concerns I’d raised with Rabin, even nodding when I compared the agreement’s security provisions to “a piece of Swiss cheese, only with more holes.” But then I said that I wanted to say a few words which I recognized were beyond my responsibility as chief of staff. “I’m speaking just as an Israeli citizen,” I told the cabinet, “and as a former head of military intelligence.” Referring to specific provisions in Oslo, and in the Camp David framework agreed by Begin and Sadat 15 years earlier, I said it was important for ministers to realize that, even though permanent-status issues were yet to be resolved, “you will be taking us nearly the whole way toward creating a Palestinian state, based on the internationally accepted reading of Camp David.” The reaction to my comments was a mix of defensiveness and hostility. In the latter camp were ministers from Rabin’s left-wing coalition partners, Meretz, who seemed especially angry when I quoted from Camp David. The Prime Minister motioned them for calm. “Ehud had a responsibility to talk about security questions, and we had a responsibility to listen. As for his additional remarks, they are not a surprise to me,” he said. “He made these points to me, and I said he could repeat them here. It is right that he should raise them.” He said there was no need for ministers to agree with me, but that it was proper that the points I’d raised should be heard.

Many clearly didn’t agree with me, or simply believed the Gaza-Jericho agreement still had to be ratified, which it was. But my remarks did lay the groundwork for my objection to the next, more far-reaching stage in the Oslo process barely a year later. By then, I was no longer chief of staff. I was a member of Rabin’s cabinet.

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