HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031850.jpg
2.64 MB
Extraction Summary
6
People
3
Organizations
8
Locations
3
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book excerpt / historical analysis (evidence production)
File Size:
2.64 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 17 of a book or article (likely by or about Henry Kissinger's 'On China') included in a House Oversight production (Bates stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031850). The text details the historical context of the US-China opening, focusing on Mao Zedong's fear of Soviet encirclement and his decision to align with the United States based on historical Chinese strategies (referencing the Romance of the Three Kingdoms). While the prompt identifies this as an Epstein-related document, the visible text contains only historical geopolitical analysis without direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein.
People (6)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Richard Nixon | Former US President |
Mentioned regarding his official visit to China and the Shanghai Communiqué.
|
| Henry Kissinger | Former Secretary of State / Author |
Analyzes the US-China relations; the text appears to be reviewing his work or perspective.
|
| Mao Zedong | Chairman of the Communist Party of China |
Discussed regarding his strategic fears of encirclement and decision to open relations with the US.
|
| Mao's Doctor | Medic/Confidant |
Had a conversation with Mao in 1969 regarding China's geopolitical enemies.
|
| Ye Jian-ying | Marshal |
Suggested strategic principles based on historical Chinese texts (Zhuge Liang).
|
| Zhuge Liang | Historical Strategist |
Cited as a historical example for strategic guiding principles.
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Soviet Union |
Mentioned as a threat to China to the north and west.
|
|
| People's Liberation Army |
Put on first-degree combat readiness in 1970.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Implied by the Bates stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'.
|
Timeline (3 events)
October 1970
Mao ordered China’s top leadership to evacuate Beijing and put the PLA on first-degree combat readiness.
Beijing, China
Unknown (Pre-1972)
Skirmishes between Soviet and Chinese forces.
Ussuri River
Soviet Forces
Chinese Forces
Locations (8)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Reference to the Shanghai Communiqué.
|
|
|
Central focus of the geopolitical analysis.
|
|
|
Geopolitical partner/counterpart.
|
|
|
Geopolitical adversary.
|
|
|
Mentioned as being to the south of China.
|
|
|
Mentioned as being to the east of China.
|
|
|
Location of skirmishes between Soviet and Chinese forces.
|
|
|
Evacuated by top leadership in October 1970.
|
Relationships (2)
Kissinger analyzes Mao's strategies and motivations in the text.
Mao discusses high-level strategy with his doctor.
Key Quotes (4)
"The result was, as he puts it, “a quasi alliance,” which, though initially intended to contain the Soviet Union, ended up outliving the Cold War."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031850.jpg
Quote #1
"“Think about this,” Mao told his doctor in 1969. “We have the Soviet Union to the north and the west, India to the south, and Japan to the east.”"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031850.jpg
Quote #2
"“Didn’t our ancestors counsel negotiating with faraway countries while fighting with those that are near?”"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031850.jpg
Quote #3
"“Ally with Wu in the east to oppose Wei in the north.”"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031850.jpg
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,074 characters)
17
Nixon’s official visit (the Shanghai Communiqué). The result was, as
he puts it, “a quasi alliance,” which, though initially intended to
contain the Soviet Union, ended up outliving the Cold War.
In this telling, however, Kissinger is able to take advantage of recent
research that illuminates the Chinese side of the story. The American
opening to China was also a Chinese opening to America, actuated
above all by Mao Zedong’s fear of encirclement. “Think about this,”
Mao told his doctor in 1969. “We have the Soviet Union to the north
and the west, India to the south, and Japan to the east. If all our
enemies were to unite, attacking us from the north, south, east, and
west, what do you think we should do?” The medic had no idea.
“Think again,” said Mao. “Beyond Japan is the United States. Didn’t
our ancestors counsel negotiating with faraway countries while
fighting with those that are near?” It was to explore the American
option that Mao recalled four Army marshals from exile. Skirmishes
were already underway between Soviet and Chinese forces on the
Ussuri River. In October 1970 Mao ordered China’s top leadership to
evacuate Beijing and put the People’s Liberation Army on “first-
degree combat readiness.” The stakes for China were high indeed—
higher than for the United States. As Kissinger shows, it was far
from unusual for Mao to refer to “our ancestors’ counsel.” Despite
his lifelong commitment to Marxism-Leninism, Mao was also steeped
in the classics of Chinese civilization, as were his close advisers. “We
can consult the example of Zhuge Liang’s strategic guiding
principle,” Marshal Ye Jian-ying suggested, “when the three states of
Wei, Shu, and Wu confronted each other: ‘Ally with Wu in the east
to oppose Wei in the north.’ ” The allusion, Kissinger explains, is to
Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a 14th-century epic novel set in the
so-called Warring States period (475–221 B.C.).
Nor was this the only occasion when China’s communist leaders
looked to the distant past for inspiration. Of equal importance to
he puts it, “a quasi alliance,” which, though initially intended to
contain the Soviet Union, ended up outliving the Cold War.
In this telling, however, Kissinger is able to take advantage of recent
research that illuminates the Chinese side of the story. The American
opening to China was also a Chinese opening to America, actuated
above all by Mao Zedong’s fear of encirclement. “Think about this,”
Mao told his doctor in 1969. “We have the Soviet Union to the north
and the west, India to the south, and Japan to the east. If all our
enemies were to unite, attacking us from the north, south, east, and
west, what do you think we should do?” The medic had no idea.
“Think again,” said Mao. “Beyond Japan is the United States. Didn’t
our ancestors counsel negotiating with faraway countries while
fighting with those that are near?” It was to explore the American
option that Mao recalled four Army marshals from exile. Skirmishes
were already underway between Soviet and Chinese forces on the
Ussuri River. In October 1970 Mao ordered China’s top leadership to
evacuate Beijing and put the People’s Liberation Army on “first-
degree combat readiness.” The stakes for China were high indeed—
higher than for the United States. As Kissinger shows, it was far
from unusual for Mao to refer to “our ancestors’ counsel.” Despite
his lifelong commitment to Marxism-Leninism, Mao was also steeped
in the classics of Chinese civilization, as were his close advisers. “We
can consult the example of Zhuge Liang’s strategic guiding
principle,” Marshal Ye Jian-ying suggested, “when the three states of
Wei, Shu, and Wu confronted each other: ‘Ally with Wu in the east
to oppose Wei in the north.’ ” The allusion, Kissinger explains, is to
Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a 14th-century epic novel set in the
so-called Warring States period (475–221 B.C.).
Nor was this the only occasion when China’s communist leaders
looked to the distant past for inspiration. Of equal importance to
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031850
Discussion 0
No comments yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this epstein document