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Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page24 of 37

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adequately protect . . . interest[s]” asserted by defend- ant); cf. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 109 (holding that orders to disclose privileged information are not imme- diately appealable even though they “intrude[ ] on the confidentiality of attorney-client communications”). If Maxwell is concerned that unsealing will open up an inevitable discovery argument for the Government, she can explain to Judge Nathan when making a sup- pression motion how an unsealing decision would have been altered by revelation of criminal discovery mate- rials to the unsealing court.4 If Maxwell is dissatisfied with the result of that suppression motion, she can raise the issue on appeal following final judgement. In short, because Judge Nathan’s Order is not effectively unreviewable on appeal after final judgment, Maxwell cannot satisfy the third prong of the collateral order doctrine.5

4 Notably, though, Maxwell has not explained how her desire to prevent the Government from mak- ing an inevitable discovery argument has any bearing on Judge Preska’s analysis of whether the First Amendment requires unsealing of judicial documents in a civil case. She offers no case law to support such an argument and does not articulate how her desire to prevent the Government from making an inevitable discovery argument impacts the unsealing analysis in a civil case.

5 In support of her argument in favor of expand- ing the collateral order doctrine to embrace her inter- locutory appeal here, Maxwell suggests that this ap- peal has not and will not delay the criminal case.

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