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722 KB
Extraction Summary
7
People
2
Organizations
3
Locations
6
Events
0
Relationships
9
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
722 KB
Summary
This legal document page outlines the Fourth Amendment's third-party doctrine, which generally holds that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily shared with third parties. It cites key Supreme Court cases like Miller and Smith to support this doctrine, while also discussing the narrow exception for cell site location information established in the Carpenter case. The document concludes by emphasizing that a defendant bears the burden of proving, through sworn evidence, that their own rights were violated to have standing to challenge a search.
People (7)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Rakas | Litigant (cited case) |
Cited in the case Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1, regarding the burden of proof for a motion to suppress.
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| Rawlings | Litigant (cited case) |
Cited in the case Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980).
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| Miller | Litigant (cited case) |
Cited in the case United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), regarding the third-party doctrine.
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| Smith | Litigant (cited case) |
Cited in the case Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979), regarding the lack of expectation of privacy for in...
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| Carpenter | Litigant (cited case) |
Cited in the case Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220, which established an exception to the third-party doctrine for cell ...
|
| Montoya-Eschevarria | Litigant (cited case) |
Cited in the case United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), regarding the burden o...
|
| Ulbricht | Litigant (cited case) |
Cited in the case United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014).
|
Organizations (2)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Supreme Court | government agency |
Mentioned as the court that has long held views on the third-party doctrine and made a ruling in the Carpenter case.
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| Government authorities | government agency |
Mentioned as the recipients of information conveyed by a third party under the third-party doctrine.
|
Timeline (6 events)
1995
The case of United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 was decided.
S.D.N.Y.
Key Quotes (9)
"[t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure."Source
— Rakas court
(Stating the legal standard for who must prove a Fourth Amendment violation in a motion to suppress.)
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Quote #1
"does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities."Source
— United States v. Miller court
(Defining the third-party doctrine under the Fourth Amendment.)
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Quote #2
"a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,"Source
— Smith v. Maryland court
(Explaining the core principle of the third-party doctrine.)
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Quote #3
"even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose,"Source
— Miller court
(Clarifying a condition under which the third-party doctrine still applies.)
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Quote #4
"a warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party."Source
— Carpenter court
(Describing the holding in the Carpenter case, which created an exception to the third-party doctrine for cell site location data.)
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Quote #5
"a narrow one,"Source
— Carpenter court
(Describing the limited scope of its own holding regarding the exception to the third-party doctrine.)
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Quote #6
"the unique nature of cell phone location information,"Source
— Carpenter court
(Providing the specific reason for the exception to the third-party doctrine.)
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Quote #7
"provides an intimate window into a person’s life,"Source
— Carpenter court
(Describing the privacy implications of cell phone location information.)
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Quote #8
"The law is clear that the burden on the defendant to establish [Fourth Amendment] standing is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of affidavit or testimony, from the defendant or someone with personal knowledge."Source
— United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria court
(Detailing the evidentiary requirement for a defendant to establish standing to challenge a search.)
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Quote #9
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,144 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 110 of 239
expectation of privacy in the places and items that were searched; and (2) whether that expectation was one that society accepts as reasonable. Id. It is axiomatic that “[t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980).
Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment “does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities.” United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Supreme Court has long held that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979), “even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose,” Miller, 425 U.S. 435, at 443. Exceptions to the applicability of the third party doctrine are narrow. For example, in Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220, the Supreme Court declined to extend the third party doctrine to cell site location information, holding that “a warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.” 138 S. Ct. at 2222. However, the Court stressed that its holding was “a narrow one,” with specific consideration given to “the unique nature of cell phone location information,” id. at 2220, which “provides an intimate window into a person’s life,” id. at 2217.
“The law is clear that the burden on the defendant to establish [Fourth Amendment] standing is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of affidavit or testimony, from the defendant or someone with personal knowledge.” United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130 n.1.
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