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750 KB
Extraction Summary
5
People
4
Organizations
0
Locations
1
Events
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Relationships
8
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
750 KB
Summary
This document is a page from a legal filing, dated April 16, 2021, discussing legal precedents concerning the modification of protective orders in the face of a grand jury subpoena. It cites several Second Circuit cases, including Martindell and Davis, to argue that a grand jury's broad investigative powers often outweigh a party's reliance on a protective order, particularly for pre-existing documents. The text emphasizes that the need for a grand jury to gather evidence in a criminal investigation is a powerful reason to permit modification of such orders.
People (5)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Martindell |
Party in the case law citation 'Martindell', which established a legal presumption regarding protective orders.
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| Davis |
Party in the case law citation 'United States v. Davis'.
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| Calandra |
Party in the case law citation 'United States v. Calandra'.
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| Branzburg |
Party in the case law citation 'Branzburg v. Hayes'.
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| Hayes |
Party in the case law citation 'Branzburg v. Hayes'.
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Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Government | government agency |
Mentioned in the context of disclosure of documents.
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| Second Circuit | court |
A U.S. Court of Appeals whose rulings and clarifications on legal precedent are cited throughout the text.
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| SEC | government agency |
The Securities and Exchange Commission, mentioned as a party in the case 'SEC v. TheStreet.com'.
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| TheStreet.com | company |
A party in the case law citation 'SEC v. TheStreet.com'.
|
Timeline (1 events)
Discussion of legal principles surrounding grand jury subpoenas and protective orders in criminal investigations, citing multiple past court cases.
Key Quotes (8)
"[t]he reliance of a private party upon protection of pre-existing documents from disclosure to the Government would normally be more difficult to justify than that of a witness who would, absent the protective order, have invoked his privilege and given no testimony at all."Source
— the court in Martindell
(A note from the Martindell case distinguishing between reliance on protective orders for pre-existing documents versus testimony.)
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Quote #1
"there [was] no indication that [a witness] agreed to testify only in reliance on [an] ‘understanding’ of confidentiality"Source
— the court in United States v. Davis
(A finding from the Davis case that made the Martindell precedent inapplicable.)
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Quote #2
"some protective orders may not merit a strong presumption against modification,"Source
— the court in SEC v. TheStreet.com
(A statement clarifying that not all protective orders carry the same weight against being modified.)
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Quote #3
"may not justify reliance by the parties"Source
— the court in SEC v. TheStreet.com
(Describing the nature of some protective orders.)
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Quote #4
"[r]anged against these considerations [relating to the policy in favor of enforcing Rule 26(c) protective orders] are the reasons for permitting the grand jury broad subpoena power in a criminal investigation."Source
— the Second Circuit in United States v. Davis
(Explaining the balance between protective orders and the power of a grand jury.)
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Quote #5
"wide ranging authority to inquire into suspected violations of the criminal law; and to effectuate such investigations it may compel the production of documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses, as it deems necessary."Source
— the Second Circuit in United States v. Davis
(Describing the authority of a grand jury.)
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Quote #6
"Wide latitude in gathering evidence is vital to the grand jury’s investigative function."Source
— the court in United States v. Calandra
(A citation supporting the broad powers of a grand jury.)
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Quote #7
"Although the powers of the grand jury are not unlimited and are subject to the"Source
— the court in Branzburg v. Hayes
(A partial quote acknowledging limits on grand jury power.)
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Quote #8
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,237 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 105 of 239
information protected thereunder, it was error for the district court to modify the magistrate’s
orders”).
orders”).
At the same time, in Martindell, the court noted that “[t]he reliance of a private party upon
protection of pre-existing documents from disclosure to the Government would normally be more
difficult to justify than that of a witness who would, absent the protective order, have invoked his
privilege and given no testimony at all.” Id. at 297 n.8; see also United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d
418, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding Martindell inapplicable and affirming enforcement of a grand
jury subpoena where “there [was] no indication that [a witness] agreed to testify only in reliance
on [an] ‘understanding’” of confidentiality and where many records sought “existed prior to the
advent of the litigation”). In subsequent cases, the Second Circuit has clarified that the Martindell
presumption comes into play only when a party reasonably relies on a protective order in providing
deposition testimony. See, e.g., Davis, 702 F.2d 418; SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 230-
31 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that “some protective orders may not merit a strong presumption against
modification,” as the nature of some orders “may not justify reliance by the parties”).
protection of pre-existing documents from disclosure to the Government would normally be more
difficult to justify than that of a witness who would, absent the protective order, have invoked his
privilege and given no testimony at all.” Id. at 297 n.8; see also United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d
418, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding Martindell inapplicable and affirming enforcement of a grand
jury subpoena where “there [was] no indication that [a witness] agreed to testify only in reliance
on [an] ‘understanding’” of confidentiality and where many records sought “existed prior to the
advent of the litigation”). In subsequent cases, the Second Circuit has clarified that the Martindell
presumption comes into play only when a party reasonably relies on a protective order in providing
deposition testimony. See, e.g., Davis, 702 F.2d 418; SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 230-
31 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that “some protective orders may not merit a strong presumption against
modification,” as the nature of some orders “may not justify reliance by the parties”).
In United States v. Davis, the Second Circuit explained that “[r]anged against these
considerations [relating to the policy in favor of enforcing Rule 26(c) protective orders] are the
reasons for permitting the grand jury broad subpoena power in a criminal investigation.” 702 F.2d
at 421. The Second Circuit noted the grand jury’s “wide ranging authority to inquire into suspected
violations of the criminal law; and to effectuate such investigations it may compel the production
of documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses, as it deems necessary.” Id. at 421-22
(citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)). “Wide latitude in gathering evidence
is vital to the grand jury’s investigative function.” Id. at 422; see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 688 (1972) (“Although the powers of the grand jury are not unlimited and are subject to the
considerations [relating to the policy in favor of enforcing Rule 26(c) protective orders] are the
reasons for permitting the grand jury broad subpoena power in a criminal investigation.” 702 F.2d
at 421. The Second Circuit noted the grand jury’s “wide ranging authority to inquire into suspected
violations of the criminal law; and to effectuate such investigations it may compel the production
of documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses, as it deems necessary.” Id. at 421-22
(citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)). “Wide latitude in gathering evidence
is vital to the grand jury’s investigative function.” Id. at 422; see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 688 (1972) (“Although the powers of the grand jury are not unlimited and are subject to the
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