HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011855.jpg

2.43 MB

Extraction Summary

9
People
7
Organizations
10
Locations
5
Events
3
Relationships
4
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Memoir/manuscript page (evidence exhibit)
File Size: 2.43 MB
Summary

This document appears to be a page (384) from a memoir or manuscript, likely by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (indicated by the header / BARAK / 98). It details the political situation in Israel following the failure of the Camp David summit and the outbreak of the Second Intifada (late 2000/early 2001). The text describes Barak's refusal to end the Oslo process at Ariel Sharon's demand, his reliance on the Shas party for a safety net in the Knesset, and his authorization of negotiators to continue peace talks under President Clinton's proposal despite escalating terrorist attacks (bombings in Jerusalem, Hadera, and Gaza) by Islamic Jihad and Hamas. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' Bates stamp, indicating it was part of a production to the US Congress.

People (9)

Name Role Context
Ehud Barak Narrator/Author (Implied)
The narrator ('I') discussing his decisions as Prime Minister of Israel regarding peace negotiations and coalitions.
Yasser Arafat Palestinian Leader
Blamed by the narrator for rejecting proposals and choosing violence over diplomacy.
Arik (Ariel Sharon) Likud Leader
Demanded a 'full divorce' from Camp David and an end to the Oslo process.
Yossi Beilin Labor Party Member
Led 'Oslo-era doves' to work out a deal with Shas.
Bill Clinton US President
Insisted on a final attempt to get a peace deal; referred to as 'Clinton' and 'the President'.
Shlomo Ben-Ami Negotiator
Authorized by narrator to continue talks.
Gili Sher Negotiator
Authorized by narrator to continue talks.
Amnon Lipkin Negotiator
Authorized by narrator to continue talks.
Yossi Ginossar Negotiator
Authorized by narrator to continue talks.

Organizations (7)

Name Type Context
Likud
Political party; narrator considered a coalition with them.
Labor
Political party; 'Oslo-era doves in Labor'.
Shas
Sephardi Orthodox party; provided a 'safety net' in the Knesset.
Knesset
Israeli Parliament.
Islamic Jihad
Terrorist group responsible for a car bomb.
Hamas
Terrorist group responsible for blowing up a school bus.
House Oversight Committee
Producing body of the document (via Bates stamp).

Timeline (5 events)

Late 2000
Camp David Summit failure
Camp David
Israel Palestinians USA
Late 2000 (Nov 2000 implied)
Islamic Jihad car bomb attack
Mahaneh Yehudah market, Jerusalem
Late 2000 (Nov 2000 implied)
Hamas school bus bombing
Gaza settlements
Late 2000 (Nov 2000 implied)
Car bombing
Hadera
Late 2000/Early 2001
Sniper fire on civilians
Gilo
Palestinian snipers

Locations (10)

Location Context
Site of failed summit.
Country.
Mahaneh Yehudah market
Jerusalem; site of car bomb.
City.
Gaza settlements
Location of school bus bombing.
City halfway between Tel Aviv and Haifa; site of car bomb.
City.
City.
Location of Palestinian snipers.
Jewish suburb of Jerusalem; target of sniper fire.

Relationships (3)

Ehud Barak Political Rivals/Negotiators Ariel Sharon
Discussing coalition terms; Barak refused Sharon's demand to end Oslo process.
Ehud Barak Strategic Alliance Bill Clinton
Barak felt responsible to continue talks to support Clinton's efforts and maintain American support.
Yossi Beilin Political Negotiation Shas Party
Beilin worked out a new deal with Shas to support the government.

Key Quotes (4)

"Arik, however, said he wanted not just a “full divorce” from Camp David. He insisted we formally declare an end to the entire Oslo process."
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011855.jpg
Quote #1
"Despite the failure of the summit... there was a wide international recognition that it was the Palestinians, not Israel, who were responsible."
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011855.jpg
Quote #2
"I felt we had a responsibility to play our part. I wasn’t prepared to put us in the position of appearing to stonewall his efforts"
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011855.jpg
Quote #3
"Yet despite all this, I authorized Shlomo Ben-Ami, Gili Sher, Amnon Lipkin and Yossi Ginossar to continue talks with Palestinian negotiators"
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011855.jpg
Quote #4

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,716 characters)

/ BARAK / 98
in legal and diplomatic terms, null and void. The package Arafat had ultimately
rejected had not even been presented by me. It was an American proposal. Besides,
it was obvious no serious negotiations were going to happen anyway for the
foreseeable future. Arik, however, said he wanted not just a “full divorce” from
Camp David. He insisted we formally declare an end to the entire Oslo process.
I told him that was a price I was not prepared to pay for his support. Despite the
failure of the summit, and the terrible human cost from Arafat’s choice of violence
over diplomacy, there was a wide international recognition that it was the
Palestinians, not Israel, who were responsible. For us to end the Oslo process
meant inviting accusations we’d never intended to reach a peace agreement in the
first place, and that it was Israel that was closing the door. We would also risk
forfeiting the American support we’d secured by our efforts to reach a peace deal,
an asset all Israeli governments would benefit from in other circumstances and
contexts in the future.
Fortunately, I had an alternative to a coalition with the Likud. Alarmed at the
prospect of a having Sharon in the government, the Oslo-era doves in Labor, led by
Yossi Beilin, worked out a new deal with Shas. The Sephardi Orthodox party was
still not prepared to rejoin the cabinet, but it did promise a “safety net” in the
Knesset to ensure we would not have to worry about no-confidence votes while
confronting the Palestinian violence. I knew Shas’s support would waver if there
was a resumption of serious peace negotiations. Still, as Clinton continued to insist
we make one final attempt to get a deal, I felt we had a responsibility to play our
part. I wasn’t prepared to put us in the position of appearing to stonewall his
efforts, and encourage the false narrative that Israeli “intransigence” was somehow
frustrating Arafat’s readiness to make peace.
The Palestinian campaign of violence was getting worse. An Islamic Jihad car
bomb near Mahaneh Yehudah market in Jerusalem injured nearly a dozen people
and left two dead. Hamas blew up a school bus in one of the Gaza settlements,
killing two more people. In Hadera, halfway up the coast from Tel Aviv to Haifa, a
car bomb on a main street left two people dead and more than 60 injured.
Palestinian snipers from near Bethlehem began opening fire on Gilo, one of the
post-1967 Jewish suburbs of Jerusalem, and home to more than 30,000 people. Yet
despite all this, I authorized Shlomo Ben-Ami, Gili Sher, Amnon Lipkin and Yossi
Ginossar to continue talks with Palestinian negotiators on the terms of the
President’s last-ditch peace proposal.
384
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011855

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