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In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012)

Treasury Department further stated that *39 Defendant Aqeel “controlled [al Haramain] and was responsible for all [al
Haramain] activities, including its support for terrorism.”44

On September 9, 2004, the United States Department of Treasury designated defendant Soliman al Buthe as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist for his role with al Haramain in the United States, which the Treasury Department stated had
“direct links” with bin Laden.45 Defendant al Buthe was also indicted on allegations that he diverted charitable donations
from al Haramain to al-Qaeda fighters in Chechnya.46 Al Buthe’s role in directing al Haramain’s activities are also revealed in
the record which states that a “document obtained by the U.S. government shows that in October, 1997, [al Haramain] in
Saudi Arabia appointed Al-Buthe its true and lawful attorney in its name, place, and stead” and “appears to give Al-Buthe
broad legal authority to act on [al Haramain’s] behalf within the United States.”47

*40 Plaintiffs’ allegation that defendant Yassin al Kadi co-founded Muwafaq Foundation with defendant Khalid bin Mahfouz
for the specific purpose of serving as a front for al-Qaeda operations likewise enjoys support in the facts and allegations
concerning al Kadi’s appointment of known terrorists to head various Muwafaq offices.48 For instance, al Kadi, himself a
close associate of Jelaidan, appointed Chafiq Ayadi to head the Muwafaq operations in Europe and Bosnia.49 On October 12,
2001, the United States listed Ayadi as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.50 Other Muwafaq offices throughout the
world were similarly populated with al-Qaeda operatives, and al Kadi acknowledges having personally selected the managers
responsible for running Muwafaq’s various offices.51 As a result of al Kadi’s deep involvement in sponsoring al-Qaeda,
through Muwafaq as well as various businesses under his control or influence, the *41 United States listed him as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist on October 12, 2001.52

Read in context and collectively, the allegations concerning the charities’ sponsorship of al-Qaeda while under the direction
and control of the Charity Official defendants provide ample support for plaintiffs’ specific contention that each of the these
defendants played a direct role in facilitating the respective charities’ sponsorship of al-Qaeda. In particular, the pleadings
make clear that the charities embraced al-Qaeda’s Islamist vision and used their global infrastructures to support al-Qaeda’s
jihad against the United States as an institutional matter.53 The institutional character of the collaboration between al-Qaeda
and the purported charities is reflected by the pervasiveness of their support, which followed a common pattern at separate
branch offices throughout the world. In several cases, the Charity Official defendants enhanced their organizations’
collaboration with al-Qaeda by appointing senior al-Qaeda officials to *42 positions of authority within their organizations.
Further, although the charities were repeatedly implicated in terrorist activities in the years following the formation of
al-Qaeda, the pattern of sponsorship continued unabated under the direction and leadership of the Charity Official defendants
for a period of many years, and in many cases even after the September 11th Attacks. These allegations, and the logical
inferences arising therefrom, established for purposes of the jurisdictional disputes that the Charity Official defendants
engaged in tortious conduct directed at the United States.

Al-Qaeda’s Collaborators in the Financial Industry

Beyond the charity sector, al-Qaeda also benefited immensely from close working relationships with a number of financial
institutions, many of which worked in concert with al-Qaeda’s charity sponsors and supporters to facilitate the transfer of
resources to al-Qaeda operations and affiliates through the international banking system.54 By virtue of its own Islamist
agenda, as well as for pragmatic reasons, al-Qaeda sought in particular partnerships with financial institutions operating
under principles of Sharia compliant finance, and was successful in finding *43 willing collaborators within that industry.55
As the Council on Foreign Relations observed in its report on terrorist financing, “[m]any prominent Islamic banks operate
under loose regulatory oversight, in part because they are based in jurisdictions without proper controls, but also because
their religious nature often allows them a greater degree of autonomy owing to obvious domestic considerations. Islamic
banks regularly co-mingle funds from depositors to place them within group investments by fund managers, creating ready
opportunities for anonymous money transfers and settlements. Moreover, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups that use Islam
to justify their actions are also more likely to find willing collaborators within the Islamic banking system.”56 Al-Qaeda’s
willing collaborators within the financial industry included Defendants National Commercial Bank, Al Rajhi Banking and
Investment Corp. (“Al Rajhi Bank”), Al Shamal Bank, Faisal Islamic Bank-Sudan, Tadamon Islamic *44 Bank, DMI Trust,
DMI Administrative Services S.A., Saudi American Bank, and Al Baraka Investment.57

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